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A bstract
One of the most enduring arguments for the introduction of co-management arrangements in 
the utilisation of natural resources is that it enhances tire enforcement of regulations and 
consequently, the sustainability' of that resource. Tins is particularly the case in most inland fisheries 
in southern African where government departments, for a variety of reasons, have been unable to 
effectively monitor fishing regulations. Some of the reasons for tins inability is the removal of 
traditional leader’s responsibilities over natural resources especially in the post-colonial period and 
budgetary constraints brought about by Structural Adjustment Programmes. Co-management 
arrangements are then unreduced not only to give fishermen a sense of responsibility over the fishery 
but to also enable them to monitor each other s fishing behaviour and impose sanctions on those 
members who violate fishing regulations. With tire introduction of co-management in most southern 
African countries which started in the mid-1980 s, changes to fisheries acts have had to do with the 
need to recognise the involvement of users in fisheries management under various collaborative 
arrangements with government agents. Co-management has not led to a re-examination of the 
fishing regulations. Instead, fishermen are still expected to observe the same fishing regulations 
which some of dieir colleagues would have been violating prior to co-management.
Tire purpose of this paper is to explore the manner in which fishing regulations in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe emerged. It show's that although the fishing regulations were aimed at protecting the 
sustainability of fisheries from a 'scientific’ perspective, their principal purpose was to protect the 
economic interests of tire dominant groups that designed them. In most cases, these interests were at 
variance with those of local fishermen thereby leading to the continuous violation and ambiguity in 
the implementation of tire fishing regulations. The paper further shows that one of the purposes for 
introducing co-management in the Zambian and Zimbabwean inshore fishery-' of Lake Kariba to 
improve the observance of fishing regulations. However, this did not lead to a re-examination of the 
relevance of the fishing regulations from tire fishennen's perspective. As a result, there has been no 
substantial change in the fishing behaviour that the co-management process sought to correct.
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Introduction
One of the most enduring arguments for the introduction o f co-management arrangements in 
the utilisation of natural resources is that it enhances the enforcement o f regulations and 
consequently, the sustainability o f that resource (Pinkerton, 1989). This is particularly the case in 
most inland fisheries in southern African where government departments, for a variety o f reasons, 
have been unable to effectively monitor fishing regulations. Some o f the reasons for this inability to 
enforce regulations are the removal o f traditional leader's responsibilities over natural resources 
especially in the post-colonial period and budgetary constraints brought about by Structural 
Adjustment Programmes in the mid-1980’s (Machena, 1993 and Mafa, 1996). Co-management 
arrangements are then introduced not only to give fishermen a sense of responsibility over the fishery 
but to also enable them to monitor each other's fishing behaviour and impose sanctions on those 
members who violate fishing regulations. With the introduction of co-management in most southern 
African countries which started in the mid-1980’s, changes to fisheries acts have had to do with the 
need to recognise the involvement of users in fisheries management under various collaborative 
arrangements with government agents (IFM and ICLARM. 1997). Co-management has not led to a 
re-examination o f the fishing regulations. Instead, under the new arrangements fishermen are still 
expected to observe the same fishing regulations which some of their colleagues would have been 
violating prior to co-management.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the manner in which fishing regulations in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe emerged. It shows that although the fishing regulations were aimed at protecting the 
sustainability of fisheries from a ‘scientific' perspective, their principal purpose was to protect the 
economic interests of the dominant groups that designed them. In most cases, these mterests were at 
variance with those of local fishermen thereby leading to the continuous violation and ambiguity in 
the implementation of the fishing regulations. Using examples from the Zambian and Zimbabwean 
inshore fisheries o f Lake Kariba, the paper further shows that one of the purposes for introducing co­
management was to improve the observance of fishing regulations. The process, however, did not 
lead to a re-examination of the way the fishing regulations emerged in the first place and their 
relevance from the fishermen’s perspective. Consequently, there was no substantial change in fishing 
behaviour that the co-management process sought to correct. In conclusion, the paper calls for a re- 
evaluation of regulations governing the utilisation of natural resources as these were designed to 
meet colonial and discriminatory interests.
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The management o f fisheries as gam e
Fisheries regulations in the southern African sub-region emerged as an adjunct of the 
Game Laws. It was for this reason that in the formulation of fisheries regulations in the early 
1940"s a fish was classified as an 'animal' and fishing was perceived to be another form of 
‘hunting.' It followed that the manner in which game was conserved was transferred to the way 
fisheries were to be regulated The then Director of Game and Tsetse Control in Zambia justified 
this transplantation of game laws to fisheries as such
Because fish arc a kind of wildlife, it follow's that the fisheries should be managed 
accordingly: we must rely on the natuial resilience of fish populations to make good the 
depletions caused by our fishing.1
Hunting restrictions that are a common feature of game legislation were also applied to 
fisheries. Hunting restrictions through various means such as closed seasons and licensing are 
meant to protect certain age groups of game species from being over-hunted. Jackson (1961) 
argued that licences were necessary in fisheries management because they limit the amount of 
fish to be harvested thereby preventing the depiction of fish resources. While this view is not 
entirely misplaced from a scientific perspective it conceals the social, political and economic role 
of fishing licences especially in the southern African region. Licences have been used as a 
measure to restrict access to natural resources. Only those who are able to meet the requirements 
for a licence can be able to fish The rest are compelled to ium to poaching to access natural 
resources. Fishing licences have also been used as a source of revenue for treasury. In most 
British colonies local administrative structures known as Native Authorities (NA's) issued 
licences to fishermen and used the proceeds to meet the cost of running these organisations. In the 
absence of a proper fish-licensing system it would not have been possible to monitor the number 
and movement of fishermen and hence the amounts due to the authorities. Gordon (2000) notes 
that in 1943 chiefs in the northern fisheries in Zambia were eager to enforce the fishing 
regulations because they benefited from the fish-licensing system. In 1946 the Bomba Superior 
Native Authority requested that licensing for the purpose of obtaining revenue is applied to all 
Bemba Native Authority areas.2 Tire Slnla and Chislnnga Native Authorities from the northern
' ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. ML 1/7/19. Vaughan Jones. 'Preliminary Report on the 
Fishing Industry and Us Markets. 1942
2 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref No. Sec 6/570. Correspondence from Provincial 
Commissioner to Director of Game and Tsetse Control. 1/4/1946
V
4
fisheries derived most of their income from this levy. Money obtained from fish licences were used 
to pay the salaries of chiefs and other employees of NA's.
p Game laws in the sub-region emerged partly as a reaction to the near depletion of big
game that had occurred as settlers moved further into the interior in the 1880’s (Mackenzie, 1987: 
41-61). The new laws, therefore, emphasised the need to protect female species accompanied by 
the young from being hunted. This was done to avoid the killing o f young species as this would 
eventually lead to the extinction of given specie. It was necessary to only allow for the hunting of 
animals that had reached such an age that their removal would not have an impact on the ability 
of the remaining species from replenishing themselves. Tire protection of young game species is 
comprehensible in that most game, especially those w'hich the laws sought to protect such as 
elephants, do not reproduce as rapidly and in large numbers as other small game species or fish. 
However, this did not deter the transmutation of these clauses to the management of fish. The 
emerging fishing regulations put stress on minimum mesh sizes of fishing nets and the admissible
j width of apertures in fishing traps and baskets. Clauses on minimum mesh-sizes were aimed at
|
preventing the harvesting of fmgerlings that was likely to cause a depletion of fish species. Other 
fishing gear such as weirs were legislated against because they were considered to be successful 
’only if  the fish move, and a fish moves, nearly always, under the impulse o f its spawning 
migration (Jackson, ibid).’
Similarly, as legislation for the conservation of game was emerging, calls were made to 
proscribe certain hunting methods considered to be ‘unfair’ to the hunted animal (Beinart and 
Coates, 1995). This was advanced into the public domain as the element of ‘sport’ in game 
management began to be pushed to the top of the conservation agenda.3 When hunting game, an 
animal had to be given an opportunity of escaping in the spirit of ‘fair play.’ Hunting methods 
considered as not giving individual hunted species a chance to escape w'ere considered 
'unsportman-like’ and prohibited. For instance, Section 33 of the Game Ordinance of 1941 
specified “no person shall for the purpose of hunting any animal drive, stampede or unduly 
disturb any such animal for any purposes whatsoever.’’ This “fair chance” approach to the hunting 
of game proved to have considerable impact on formulation of fisheries regulations.4 Under the
3 According to Mackenzie (1987: 22-40) hunters also anthropomorphised animals in attempt to suggest a 
degree of equality in the contest and therefore emphasise the physical endurance and courage required in 
the Hunt. Thus, the killing of intelligent animals such as the elephant provided the greatest exhilaration.
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section dealing w ith the management of fisheries, the Game Ordinance of 1941 prohibited the 
isolation of fish from the main water body for the purpose of catching the fish that w'ould have 
been isolated. When new legislation on fishing was drawn-up in 1943, fish driving or kuiumpula 
at it w'as locally known, was banned. The argument for banning kutumpula was that the driving 
of fish into nets by splashing and beating of paddles is intrinsically harmfi.il as it operates in 
shallow and weed}' areas where the fish go to breed.4 5 Other methods such as the use of fish-traps 
were considered to be accounting for a large number of small fish and fry and consequently 
banned. Even when it was realised that some form of traps were necessary to catch certain 
species of grown fish, it did not prevent the authorities from maintaining the ban on the use of 
traps.6 While the protection of the young was paramount in banning these fishing methods, they 
were also considered an easy and hence unfair way of fishing.
While the emerging fisheries regulations were as much based on the way game was 
managed, it was also a reflection of the colonial authorities ignorance o f the effect o f local fishing 
devices and methods on fish stocks. As Chirwa (1996: 351-377) has noted on similar experiences 
in the Lake Malawi fishery', the new regulations did not take into account some of the positive 
effects and weaknesses of African's fishing gear and methods. Weirs and traps were employed in 
shallow waters, and especially during the dry season. During the rainy season when the rivers, 
marshes and lagoons flooded, the traps were removed for fear that they might be washed away. 
They were also constmcted in such a manner that fish fry could easily pass through. Fish poison 
could only be used in still or slow moving waters and its effectiveness was limited to a short
4 The classification of hunting between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ hunting methods was aimed at outlawing the latter 
methods. The use of traps, baskets and nets, which had been predominantly the preserve of Africans, were 
proscribed in the new pieces of regulations. The accepted methods were basically modelled on Anglo- 
Saxon notions of 'good' hunting affording a hunted prey a 'fair chance'. According to Beinart and Coates 
(1995: 28). this crusade of outlawing local hunting methods gave rise to the emergence of various 
conservation oriented groups such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds w hose main concern was 
to fight against the plumage trade. Such groups emerged in the colonies as well.
Although kutumpula was frowned upon as a fishing method, the authorities were sometimes forced to 
ignore this fishing method due to the resistance of local fishermen. For instance, the Fish Control (Mweru- 
Luapula) Fishing Regulations specifically noted that kutumpula was to be authorised. (ZAMBIA 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. ML 1/7/18, Correspondence from District Commissioner. Kawambwa 
to Director of Game and Tsetse Control. 1949.)
6 While the authorities desired to ban these fishing methods, it was logistically impossible to ensure that 
local fishermen did not use them, For instance, commenting on the use of fish traps in 1943. the Acting 
Director of Game and Tsetse Control observed that fish trapping is so much a part of native custom that 
complete prohibition, other than under exceptional conditions would be out of the question.' ZAMBIA 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. Sec 6/570
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period. The amount, depth, and flow of water could easily reduce its strength. Scudder (1960: 41- 
49) also made similar observations in his study of Tonga fishing methods on the Zambezi River 
prior to construction of Lake Kariba.
Once these scientific' arguments for the management of fish had been advanced and 
legislation drawn, their implementation was an entirely different affair. Their strict 
implementation had to fit into the economic context o f the colonial state. The section below 
explores how' this was achieved in the Zambian context.
It was only after 1940 that significant efforts to begin to develop and enforce a local policy 
for the conservation of fisheries w ere made. Firstly, while the fishing had been a source of food and 
employment even before the colonial period, it was now discovered by the authorities that it would 
benefit the economy more if some measures were implemented to control the industry'. This was 
based on the prevalence of numerous water bodies where fishing was taking place. These water 
bodies w ere estimated to have produced fish worth more titan one hundred and fifty thousand British 
Pounds per annum.7 8 The fishing industry' was also a major source of employment prompting the 
Director of Game and Tsetse Control (DGTC) to conclude that 'game and fish, as also tsetse fly. are 
so much a pait of everyday life of Africans. Secondly, with an increase in industrial activity 
following a boom in copper pnees that occurred in 1939, efforts began to be made to source cheap 
food for the large labour force employ ed in the mines. Although beef was initially used to feed the 
labour on the mines problems associated with supply that occurred in the early 1940's prompted the 
authorities and mine owners to begin to explore alternative sources of cheap food supplies for labour. 
Gordon (2000: 91) observes that severe beef shortages that occurred in 1941. 1943 and later in 1948 
compelled mine owners to import five hundred tons of fish from a Congolese supplier to pacify’ the 
restless workers. Food prices went up causing instability in the urban areas. This compelled the 
authorities to impose price controls as a short-term measure. The District Commissioner (DC) 
responsible for the Coppcrbelt implored the Director responsible for the fisheries sector to maximise 
fish production by also suspending the existing section on fishing regulations in the Game Ordinance
ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCFIIVES Ref. No. Sec 6/190. Correspondence from Acting Director of Game 
and Tsetse Control to Secretary to Cabinet. 1943.
8 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref No. Sec 6/569. Correspondence from Acting Director of Game 
and Tsetse Control to Secretary’ for Native Affairs. 1949. The fisheries sector was managed under the 
Department of Game and Tsetse Control that was later renamed the Department of Game and Fisheries in 
1963.
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of 1941. The enforcement of the regulations was seen as contributing to the shortage of fish on
:rbelt. The DC argued that:
We are having some difficulty in keeping our workers contended here owing to short 
supplies. The point may be reached when discontent will have serious repercussions on 
copper production, which would be more disastrous even than upsetting the mtemal 
economy of Northern Province or depleting its fish supplies for a time. Bangweulu fish 
supplies have some bearing on copper production.9 *1
This statement is evident of the importance with which copper production was linked to the 
availability of cheap food for the labour. To the owners of the mines the collapse of the fishing 
industry was not as paramount as long as copper production was sustained. The director of the 
DGTC concurred with the DC by observing that 'the importance of maintaining a smooth 
atmosphere on the Copperbelt was so great that fish supplies should be given a high importance 
relative to that of opposing factors.’ Fishing regulations were consequently relaxed and the supply of 
fish on the Copperbelt temporarily improved.1" Follow ing the other food shortages that occurred 
on the Copperbelt in 1943, the authorities responded by invoking Emergence- Powers (Control of 
Fish) Regulations. These emergence measures were designed to control the distribution of food 
especially fish." These regulations gave the Director of the DGTC a evide range of poevers to deal 
with the distribution of fish be prohibiting the importation or export of fish into or from any Fishery 
Area.1" They further empowered the Director to issue permits on the export of fish and he could 
make limitations on weight of fish or the market in which it was supposed to be sold. He was also 
empoeeered to seize fish at such time and place as lie save fit if the owner of the fish eeas paid in 
accordance with the gazetted fish prices. The emergence regulations further gave tire Director of the 
DGTC authority to enter into contracts for earn ing out any work in connection with handling, 
storage, grading or disposal of fish. Tire measures made it possible for the government to supple- fish
9 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. See 6/190. Correspondence from Provincial 
Commissioner. Western Province to Director of Game and Tsetse Control 1943
Although fish supplies temporarily improved following the suspension of the fishing regulations, the fish- 
price controls that were also imposed at the same time merely drove fish from the fonnal market into the 
parallel market.
11 According to the Provincial commissioner in charge of the Copperbelt. which was then known as the 
Western Province, beginning in 1943 there was a shortage of various commodities on the Copperbelt. 
including foodstuffs. The consequence of these shortages was that fish prices went up and controls were 
introduced. However, this only managed to drive fish off the official market and into the parallel market 
where prices were high. (ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref No. 6/190. 1/8/1943).
A Fishery Area was a fishery' covered by the Fish Control Regulations.
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to the Copperbelt thereby averting a major disruption to copper production. The controls were
abolished in 1946 when the distribution of fish improved.13
Ambiguity in the application o f  fisheries regulations
Due to the diverse factors that infonned the way in which the fisheries regulations 
emerged there was bound to be ambiguity and resentment in their application. The DGTC did not 
also have adequate staff to implement the fishing regulations. In some o f the fisheries in remote 
areas it was the DC's and other colonial officials acting on their own preconceived assumptions 
of fisheries management who enforced the fishing regulations. The issuing o f fishing licences was 
particularly problematic. Native Authorities issued licences to fishermen who fished from water 
bodies under their jurisdiction. However, local fishermen could migrate from one fishery to 
another for different reasons In some instances, the migration would take the fishermen to 
fisheries in other NA’s. This movement o f fishermen across boundaries proved to be a problem in 
some NA s as it deprived them of much needed revenue.14
The enforcement o f minimum net mesh-sizes and types o f nets to be used were also a 
contentious issue between the authorities and fishermen. The minimum mesh sizes were designed 
o ensure that all the fish caught in a net were bigger and would have bred once. This regulation 
ignored the fact that some fish species could reach their maximum size without being caught in 
the minimum allowed mesh-sizes. In 1949, fishermen in Kasempa in the north-western part o f the 
country complained that the institution o f minimum mesh-size for their fishing nets caused them 
to lose many fish. They argued that the fish species that they particularly targeted were so small 
even at maturity as not to be captured in the nets that they were legally supposed to use.15 The
13 It was during this period that the Director of Game and Tsetse recommended that fish exports to Zimbabwe 
be banned. This ban affected the urban population in Zimbabwe that was reliant on fish supplies from Zambia. 
These fish- exports had amounted to about 5.000 kg’s in 1943. However, the ban on fish-exports did not stop 
Zambian fish-traders from smuggling large quantities of fish into that country. (ZAMBIA NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES. Ref. No. Sec 6/190. Correspondence from Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 
1944.).
14 This ambiguity in the British colonial policies has been extensively studied by Berry. She points out that 
in seeking to maintain social and administrative stability by building on tradition, colonial officials wove 
instability -  in the form of changing relations of authority and conflicting interpretations of rules -  into the 
fabric of colonial administration (Berry. 1993).
15 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. SEC 6/570, Acting Director of Game and Tsetse Control, 
'Preliminary Report on the Fishing Industry and its Markets, 21/10/1949.
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W K  disputed this argument and observed that the fish that was not caught in the legally allowed 
;vKts was not of economic value and did not warrant the change of the mesh-size regulations 
(ibid). In 1953, a Fisheries Officer in Kawambwa reported that he was unable to enforce the 
mesh-size regulations due to resistance by local fishermen. He complained that the mesh system 
in the fisheries under Ins jurisdiction was farcical due to non-observance of the regulations by the 
local fishermen, C. wcommended that fishing regulations should no longer apply in that 
fishery.10 Ill another example, in 1954 it was agreed that due to resistance by local fishermen and 
the' lack of adequa;: personnel, fish conservation regulations in the Northern Province be 
abandoned in all but the following fisheries; Mweru-Luapula; Mweru-wa-Ntipa; Lake 
Tanganyika and Bangweulu-Luapula.17 The restrictions on the use o f weirs were declared 
ineffective and impossible to enforce especially in the swampy Bangweulu fisheries. Faced with 
these problems, the Fisheries Officer for the area unilaterally declared that w'eirs did not in fact 
destroy the fry' in the lake and called for the relaxation of the ban on w eirs. The Fisheries Officer 
was compelled to take this decision following the Luwingu Native Authority refusal to ban weirs. 
Fishermen caught using weirs and brought before the authority were merely discharged with 
verbal warnings and not fined.18 In some instances, the regulations were relaxed but despite the 
abandonment or suspension of all or certain provisions o f the fishing regulations, the clause 
pertaining to licensing was always retained. This was meant not to disrupt the collection of 
revenue for NA's
Inadcvi w :ow ledge o f the biological status o f the local fisheries by authorities was 
also anothei unbiguity in the application o f fishing regulations. In 1942, the seine net
was banned wi. 1 u observed that the net was destructive and w'Ould lead to depletion o f fish.19 
The problem evidence’ was that it was based on perceptions and not actual
experiments u be then Director of the DGTC wrote to a Game Warden based in Fort
Rosebery (k
16 ZAMBIA x a a ) ■ ' 1 ARCHIVES. Ref. No. SEC 6/570 Correspondence from Fisheries Officer, Fort 
Rosebern to Dme vi < .uumissioner, Kawambwa. 1953.
17 ZAMBIA NA i IONA.) ARCHIVES, Ref. No. SEC 6/570 Correspondence from Director of Game and 
Tsetse Control io nslu ncs Officer, 1954.
18 ZAMBIA NA I ION.a!. ARCHIVES, Ref. No. SEC 6/570, Correspondence from Fisheries Officer to 
Director of Game .md t seise Control, 1954.
19 ZAMBIA N \ . A ■ - ’ ARCHIVES, Ref. No: SEC 6/508, Correspondence from District Commissioner,
Gilbert Phillip-, m A Commissioner, Kasama, 7th November, 1942.
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Labeo and Hydrocyon (sic) arc agreed as being in need of control so far as trade in 
immature specimens is concerned. I feel that Auchenglcmis (sic) is badly in need of 
protection, though I have no data at present to support this general opinion. Chrysichthis 
is perhaps fairly safe: if, however, it is likely to have to come into this restriction within 
the fairly near future, it had best be put in now. Are there any other species which should 
be considered in this connection?20
To conduct biological research, it was argued, was’ not necessary in the face of a 
perceived catastrophe in the fishing industry. Proper research would take time and the results 
might be too late to prevent a tragedy in the colony's fisheries:
We cannot proceed very far without proper research, but as, even if commenced now, that 
would take some time to give results. I consider that our present action on empirical lines 
is fully justified in view of the urgency of the fishery problem in the territory.21 2
In the absence of a full-fledged research framework it is not clear what the Director of the 
DGTC referred to as 'empirical lines' in terms of the policy towards the fishery sector. It can 
however be assumed that since the authorities were generally of the opinion that local fishing 
methods had a negative effect on fish stocks, they deemed it necessary to impose restrictions even 
in the absence of scientific proof. It was thought prudent to impose these conservation measures, 
under the given circumstances, due to the importance of the fishing industry to the economy of 
the country. The other reason why the authorities could not wait for scientific research was the 
perception by staff of the DGTC that their primary function was to protect the destruction of 
natural resources and not that of conducting research. For instance, in a memorandum concerning 
the foundation o f the DGTC, the person who was later to head this same department argued that 
'general scientific research did not imply that the department was to possess the qualifications of 
a research institute ""
20 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No: SEC 6/158. Director of Game and Tsetse Control to 
Fisheries Officer. Fort Rosebery, 1941.
21 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. SEC 6/10 Correspondence from Acting Director of Game 
and Tsetse Control to member for Agriculture and Natural Resources. 16th January, 1951.
22 Vaughan-Jones. T.G.C., ‘Memorandum on Policy Concerning the Foundation of a Game Department and 
the Conservation of Fauna in Northern Rhodesia.' Government Printers, Livingstone. 1938.
Differences in the relevance of the fishing regulations were not only between the 
unties and the fishermen but also within the colonial establishment itself. In 1953. a biologist 
Rpom the Commonwealth Office in London challenged the manner in which fisheries regulations
designed and implemented in the colonies. He observed that fisheries regulations in the
hi
colonies were modelled on United Kingdom Fisheries Regulations o f 1866 and on game laws and 
tints faulty.23 He said that these 1866 laws had borrowed heavily on game laws and the analogy 
between game and fish was dangerous because stocks o f game can be watched and even 
enumerated and their breeding rate is slow. On the contrary, fish stocks had an extremely rapid 
rate of breeding, and they cannot be directly watched, but only indirectly by conclusions drawn 
from the results of commercial fishing and of biological research:
Wide fluctuations in the abundance of fish or even their complete disappearance, may 
occur naturally, and have no connection with man's activity. Such catastrophes might 
result from changes in climate and rainfall, from landslides blocking rivers, from changes 
of ocean currents and variations of prevailing winds. Huge unexplained mortality o f fish 
is reported from time to time. The w ide variations from year to year o f herring and other 
fisheries are now in man}' cases understood, and can even be predicted. Nevertheless, 
they cannot be regulated by any remedy at present foreseeable (ibid).
He concluded that most of the restrictions and prohibitions currently in use in the 
colonies were of a doubtful nature. The licensing of gear or nets required large and expensive 
enforcement staff. Other measures such as closed seasons: mesh-size restrictions and size o f fish 
regulation were not very useful either. Fish fences were also harmless because if only a small 
number of fish suffice to replenish stocks, then there w as no need in allow ing excessive numbers 
to spawn and the capture of the surplus was an economical exploitation. He argued that mesh- 
size regulations, which were designed to take only the largest category of fish, must result in the 
dysgenic removal, for generation after generation, of the best-growing strains.24 This left future 
breeding increasingly to the poorer strains and the result of attempts to restrict capture only to the 
larger fish might be fewer and fewer large fish to be caught.
"3 While n may be true that some of the provisions of the fishing regulations were modelled on the United 
Kingdom Regulations of 1866, I however, think that the largest influence to local fishing regulations were 
mostly the game conservation policies developed in the Cape Province during the 1800’s. (ZAMBIA 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Hickling. C.F.. 'Memorandum on Fisheries regulations.' Colonial Office. 
London. November. 1952.)
' 4 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Hickling. C.F.. ’Memorandum on Fisheries regulations,’ Colonial 
Office. London. November. 1952.
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The reaction to the biologists' observations by officers in the DGTC was mixed but 
generally reflected the government's policy towards the fishing industry. While agreeing to the 
biologists' general thesis, a Fisheries Officer in the DGTC observed that the biologist did not take 
into account ' 'Actors important in Central Africa;' He said that fishing methods of Africans 
were "so primitive that weirs across tributaries allowed no fish to escape and that some river- 
pools fished r.'inmunally by spears and baskets had no survivors"." The African fishermen were 
so primiti\c dir,- m them it only became uneconomic to continue fishing when there was no fish 
left and not v.l. n  the fish were merely diminished (ibid). While this argument sought to respond 
to the biologists’ argument on scientific grounds, the Director in the same department was more 
open about the actual objectives of the type of fishing regulations in the colony; He argued that 
the reasons for die existing regulations were that licensing was a source of revenue to support the 
N A 's' Seeondjv it was argued that fishing was the major industry in which most o f the 
Africans in ; a-a! areas were employed and that Africans were so dependent on fishing and had 
not developed alternative economic activities. Consequently, there was a need for the existing 
fishing regulations to avoid an unemployment catastrophe in the event that the fishing industry 
collapsed. Such fishing regulations were ‘not only reasonable but positively desirable.’27 
Thirdly, the Director acknowledged that the mesh size regulation may or may not be an 
unneccssarv restriction, but as it already existed it was going to be a psychological error to 
abolish it until it was quite certain that it was not necessary. The position of the department was 
summarised in this manner:
ZAMBIA ■ ATONAL ARCHIVES, Correspondence from Fisheries Officer to Director of Game and 
Tsetse Comroh 'Dr 1 tickling's Circular on Regulations. 1953.
' Officially ’Tc was not put so openly. It was usually said that the main reason for licensing was ‘to 
stimulate the N niu: Authorities interest in the conservation of fish’ (ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. 
Correspondence Irom Fisheries Officer to Director of Game and Tsetse Control. 'Dr. Hickling’s Circular on 
Regulations. l!i5Li.
ZAMBIA NA'i 10NAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. 6/190. Correspondence from Colonial Office. London, to 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia. 18th May. 1944.
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We are designing a new set of regulations. The proposed regulations provide a wider 
basis for licensing; including licensing of weirs and 'general' fishing methods, on 
principle that such wealth would be useful to the Native Authority On the other hand, 
present restrictions on basket traps, which are somewhat irksome and technically not very 
useful, will be abolished. The minimum three inch mesh will provisionally be retained, 
more as a general guide to what is. on available evidence, a satisfactory size than a 
categorical minimum, for there is provision to make exceptions.21'
Following this debate, a number of changes in the management o f fisheries wure 
instituted. These amendments separated the management of fisheries from that of game. The 
ither reason for separating the management of fish from game was that the number of fishermen 
had increased and the quantity offish caught had increased to such an extent that there was a need 
for effective control. It was also observed that there was a need for coming up with a new act 
dealing specifically with fish so as to introduce 'minor fishing licences’ for methods of fishing 
other than by nets such as spears, baskets, scoops, mats and weirs. In terms of weirs it sought to 
remove the law leaving a gap in a weir. It was reasoned that licensing weirs would in itself be a 
hindrance to the making of the same gear and would automatically cease to be used. ° This new 
act became known as the Fish Conservation Ordinance of 1955. The principal objectives of the 
new ordinance remained the same as those of the previous ones. It regulated fishing appliances, 
placed restrictions on minimum mesh sizes and also prescribed that offences and penalties to be 
meted out to those fishermen who violated the ordinance. In particular it also specified that 
licensing would have to be imposed on all fishermen operating from fisheries under the control of 
the various NA's.
Post-colonial fisheries regulations
In 1963. the DGTC was renamed the Department of Game and Fisheries. It was also 
transferred to the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources following the abolition of the Ministry 
of Native Affairs under which it had been located. In 1965, the Fish Conservation Ordinance and 
the Fish Control (Mweru-Luapula Fisheries Area) Regulations were amended. In 1974 all the 
different pieces o f regulations such as Fish Conservation Ordinance and the Fish Control 
(Mweru-Luapula Fisheries Area) Regulations w'ere combined to create the Fisheries Act of 1974.
ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. 6/570. Correspondence from Director of Game and Tsetse 
Control to Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources. 27/2/1953.
: ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES, Ref. No. 6/570. Director of Game and Tsetse Control. Notes on 
New Features m the Draft Fisheries Conservation Bill. 11/12/1952.
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Iflthe same year, the Department o f Fisheries (DoF) was also established. The Fisheries Act still 
provides for the development o f fishing, control o f fishing. The enforcement of the act is 
Supplemented by periodical Statutory Instruments. However, due to the manner in which the 
regulations emerged in Zambia coupled with the inadequate government funding to DoF, the 
implementation of fishing regulations has not been very effective. Almost all fishermen 
interviewed admit that the fishing regulations are not an inconvenience to their fishing activities 
and the flouting o f the regulations is widespread.
Fisheries regulations in Z im babw e
Like in Zambia, the BSAC led the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890. It was during 
company rule that efforts to control access to and the manner o f harvesting natural resources were 
made. In a Proclamation of 10th June, 1881 issued under Order-in-Council o f 9th May. 1891, the 
Game Law Amendment Act. 1886 of the Cape o f Good Hope became the game of law of 
Zimbabwe. This piece o f  legislation was aimed at protecting big mammals such as elephants that 
were considered to be in danger of being over-hunted by ivory hunters, missionaries and builders 
of railway lines and roads.’0 In 1923 the white settlers in Zimbabwe declared self-rule and six 
years later in 1929 they passed the Game and Fish Preservation Act. It was in this new act that there 
was a direct reference to the way fisheries resources were to be utilised in Zimbabwe.
The Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 attempted to consolidate and amend the law 
for the better preservation of game and to design an act that would reflect the realities in 
Zimbabwe. The amendments dropped all references to Cape Province that had remained in the 
previous pieces of regulations. The Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 provided for 
indefinite periods for which protection may be given to animals and birds other than game. The 
act also increased the amount of fines to be paid by those who hunted game without obtaining a 
licence from an administrator in the district. For the first time, a section dealing with artisanal 
fishing was also included. As in the way that game was conserved, the section on fish in the act 
prohibited the use o f drag, cast, stake or other nets and determined that any under-sized fish shall 
be returned to the water. The act also prohibited the use of dy namite or chemicals or fishing
M It is during this phase of colonial penetration into the interior that Mackenzie has associated with the 
transformation of hunting into the Hunt for the benefit of a few people from among the settler community 
(McKenzie. 1987: 41-62).
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a licence. As with other pieces of regulations on natural resources, these restrictions oi 
methods marginalised Africans’ access to fisheries or game. Most of them could nc 
to obtain the required licences and did not have resources or time to utilise the require' 
or fishing implements and methods.
i t -
Reflecting the emerging land tenure system in the country, the act made it a punishabl 
5 offence to enter or trespass the land of another person in the pursuit of game or fishing withoi 
the authority of the landowner. The ordinance allow ed any person to have capacity to prosecut 
as a private prosecutor any person charged with any offence under the Ordinance. This gave 
wide range of powers by those who had private properties to prosecute anyone who poached o 
trespassed on their properties with the intention of poaching. This provision protected th 
emergence of a strong lobby-group from among the settler community that w ere importing exoti 
fish species for stocking local waters. With the strengthening of the trespass laws in the Game an 
Fisheries Preservation Act of 1929. there was an increased private initiative to introduce exoti 
fish-species in the country that started in earnest in the late 1920‘s. The new act gave powers t 
the territory’s administrator to authorise any association or person to introduce, in defined waters 
any fish not native to such w ater as well as making provision for that introduced fish to grow t 
exploitable levels. This provision saw a tremendous increase and growth o f a sport-fishin: 
industry' in the territory from among the settler community. Between 1936 and 1946 a total o 
seventy-three government notices were made in relationship to the Game and Fish Preservatio: 
Act of 1929. Most of these notices were to authorise an organisation known as the Rhodesi 
Angling Society to introduce alien fish into the w'aters of the colony and also to ban fishing for 
period of five years to allow the introduced fish to breed. In 1938. the Game and Fis 
Preservation Act was renamed the Game and Fish Amendment Act. The amendments were 
result of strong pressure that was being exerted on government by associations with an interest i 
angling, sport and !1\ -fishing who now wanted direct government funding for their activities 
Institutions such as the Flyfishers Association o f Southern Rhodesia lobbied government t  
provide financial assistance to angling clubs that wished to import exotic fish species ffor 
outside the country. The society also asked for more powers to control the manner in which th 
exotic species were stocked and harvested.
The emergence of a strong sport-fishing lobby in the country is due to a number c 
factors. Firstly, the country had a much large settler-community compared to colonies such a 
Zambia. Mofi of the settlers were from Europe and made efforts to see the development o f fis
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fangling as a sport in the country. They formed associations and lobbied government for funding 
Pin import ova from the Cape and further north as Scotland In 1938 trout ova were imported from 
Scotland for the stocking of the colony's fisheries (Bell-Cross and Minshull, 1988). Later an 
|  umbrella organisation known as the Trout Acclimatisation Society was formed to co-ordinate the 
1 operations of associations interested in the importation of Trout ova. When the imports of ova 
from Scotland became expensive efforts were made to obtain the ova from South Africa. Imports 
from South Africa consisted mostly of the Largcmouth Black Bass. Carp. Rainbow and Brown 
Trout. One common feature of these imports is that they were meant to improve the fish-angling 
freilities in Zimbabwe and little attention was paid to their potential as food (Toots. 1970: 1-6). 
Secondly, the land tenure system, which wns introduced through the Land Apportionment Act 
(LAA) in 1930. benefited the settlers at the expense of the local people. It was on these private 
lands that most of the dams W'ere built to provide irrigation water for agricultural activities. These 
dams and other water bodies on National Parks and Wildlife Management estates proved 
invaluable in the emergence of fishing as a sport.
In 1944. the Southern Rhodesia National Anglers Association w'as formed. By 1947 
similar associations had become so politically entrenched that they began to lobby government to 
amend the Game and Fisheries Act to give more responsibilities on the management o f water 
bodies to its members. These amendments were made towards the end of 1947 when the act made 
members o f the Angling Societies into Honorary- Fish Wardens. The wardens had powers to 
prohibit fishing and apprehend those doing so in water-bodies located on private property’1. 
Those caught were liable to fines ranging between five and tw!enty-five Rhodesian pounds. The 
various angling associations also established research stations in the country to improve the strain 
of imported fish species to local conditions. Some of these research stations w'ere privately run 
while others relied on government subsidies. These included the Mashonaland Highveld Research 
Centre at Lake McIIwaine. Trout Station at Nyanga, Matopo’s and Southeast Low veld at Kyle. 
The research station at Kyle was responsible for research on Bass. It was only in 1966 that the 
Department o f National Parks and Wildlife Management assumed responsibility for all fish 
research in the countrv. 312
31 Zimbabwe National Archives, Ref. No. S482/637/39. Correspondence from Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Secretary. Department of Agriculture and Land. 2/4/1942.
32 Government of Southern Rhodesia. Ministry of Mines and Lands. ‘Reports of National Parks Advisory' 
Board and Director of National Parks and Wildlife Management for 1966.’ Government Printers. Salisburv. 
1967.
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The settler government's pre-occupation in Zimbabwe was on the development o f settler 
agriculture. In this regard, it left the development of the fishing industry to private lobby-groups. 
The fishing regulations that emerged were driven more by individuals, associations and clubs 
with an interest in sport fishing. The lack of interest in fishing as an industry' can be seen from the 
fact that government lacked adequate capacity to monitor the sector. It was only in 1949 through 
the passing of the National Parks Act came into force that the government employed officers 
specifically responsible for fisheries. However, even with these changes the policy thrust of the 
National Parks Board was to support sport angling. The board decreed that angling could be done 
in all water bodies in the country's national parks except the Hwange National Park where the 
facility was rendered unsafe due to the danger from wild animals.”  Prior to the creation of the 
board the government had in 1948 hired a consultant from South Africa to advise the territory on 
the potential of inland fisheries. ’4 He observed that the country already had waters that were w'ell 
stocked with fish and recommended that a sound fisheries policy was necessary' for the creation of 
new fisheries department and the maintenance of waters which had already been stocked with 
exotic species. His major recommendation was that fisheries policy should put emphasis on sport 
fishing to attract tourists (Hey, 1948). He observed that the restocking of some of the country's 
water bodies should concentrate more on fishes that "have virtues of superiority in fighting 
abilitv.” To his credit, however, he also recommended that a fisheries department be created to 
specifically deal with fisheries. The primary responsibility of this department was to create 
breeding pools, hatcheries, and a central experimental fish farm to serve the dual function of 
producing fish for stocking and conducting experiments in fish farming. He also recommended 
that a Department o f Fish be created. This w as seen as a means of avoiding swamping fisheries 
issues under other portfolios such as agriculture and veterinary (Hey. 1948).
The policy on sport fishing marginalised local fishermen in a number o f ways. Firstly', the 
sport was carried-out on private properties where local people faced prosecution for trespassing 
and poaching. This placed most of the water bodies out of reach of local fishermen. Secondly, due 
to the high cost involved and the racial policies that prevailed at the time, local African fishermen 
could not form Angling Associations or join existing ones. In any case, even they managed to 
form associations they would still have problems in accessing water bodies from where to do the
Federal Ministry' of Agriculture. ’Memo on Fishing' Salisbury . 1955 ppl-6.
u Hey D.. Report of A Survey During July-August 1948 on the Potentialities of Inland Fisheries in 
Southern Rhodesia. Stellenbosch. Inland Fisheries Department. Cape Tow n. 1948.
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fishing. Other non-white races were treated much better. In 1952. it was decided that no 
restrictions should be placed on the rights of Asiatic and Coloured people to fish in park waters 
on the same basis as Europeans who were not members of particular Angling Societies 
concerned.’1
The emphasis on sport fishing meant that fish caught by members of the angling clubs 
was largely for sport and not for commercial purposes or consumption. The argument was that the 
settlers already had an occupation and enough food to eat and thus did not bother to make fish as 
a staple. Even the consultant who had been hired to draw a fisheries policy for the country 
recommended that sporting species be introduced into the territory's water bodies and that 
undesirable (or unsporting) species such as catfishes should to be got rid of (Hey. 1948: 9). The 
view from most members of the angling clubs was that the country had been forced to adopt this 
type of fishing regulations to prevent the total collapse of fisheries resources through the bad 
fishing methods employed by Africans Africans were accused of using explosives and throwing 
poisonous plants and remnants o f local-beers into the water and scooping out all sizes of the 
dazed fish. These methods, it was argued, did not give fish a ‘sporting chance', and hence needed 
to be banned. These views completely ignored the importance of fish as a means of food or 
employment for the majority of the local African fishermen It merely rc-cmphasised the 
prejudices o f the settler-community town ids local fishing methods.
In 1975. a Parks and Wildlife Board was created This followed the repealing of various 
acts related to the conservation of wildlife among them the Fish Conservation Act of 1960. The 
new act became known as the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975. In terms o f fish conservation the 
act still retained provisions on how fishing is to be conducted and the fishing methods that were 
not authorised. These still remained the same as from the previous acts. The act authorised the 
minister responsible for the country's fisheries to declare any person to be the Appropriate 
Authority for any waters m the country. The act further empowered the minister to declare any 
waters as Fish Conservation Areas if it was considered that there was a threat to the fish in those 
particular waters. However, further controls on actual fishing were instituted: no person was 
allowed to fish in any waters without a permit with the exception of those given Appropriate
^  Government of Southern Rhodesia. Ministry of Mines and Lands. "Report of the National Parks 
Advisory Board for the Year ended 31 December 1953.” Government Printers. Salisbury. 1954.
'6 Bulawayo Chronicle. Letter to the Editor.' 2Klh June 1948.
19
Mbority. Other prohibitions included the use of poisons, chemicals or explosive devices in the 
(png of fish. It was also an offence to disturb any fish on its spawning run or in such areas as 
pawn is deposited. The provisions on the introduction of alien fish were retained from the 
wvious acts. A number of gear was totally banned. These included spears, spear guns or basket 
taps. To date, the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 governs the conservation of fish in Zimbabwe.
Pishing regulations for Lake kariba
Lake Kariba is an artificial water body located on the Zambia/Zimbabwe border. Before 
die Zambezi River was impounded to create Lake Kariba fishing was largelv for subsistence bv 
the local population. The various fishing regulations and legislations that were emerging in the 
two countries did not apple to the Zambezi River. The Fish Conservation Ordinance and 
' subsequent ones in Zambia could only be applied to fisheries that had been prescribed by the 
director responsible for fisheries. The Zambezi River was not a prescribed fishery and 
consequently the ordinances did not apply to it. Similarly , the Game and Fish Preservation Act in 
Zimbabwe did not apply to the Zambezi River. It was argued that the act was meant to regulate 
inland waters only and could not be applied to internationally shared water-bodies such as the 
Zambezi R i v e r . T h e  major reason is that fish production from the river was seasonal and 
relatively marginal compared to much more productive fisheries such as the Kafue and 
Mwcru/Luapula system. The authorities were not duly concerned with controlling fish products 
from such a marginal fishery. Secondly, the Zambezi River was a malaria-prone area with poor 
access roads compared to other fisheries that were closer to urban areas and had all weather roads. 
As such, the liver did not attract the attention of either fishermen or government authorities at the 
time.
In preparation for the full exploitation of the new Lake Kariba fishery, the Zambian 
authorities began to conduct a number of biological experiments. By I960 results from these 
experiments began to be available, it was on the strength of these experiments that the Zambian 
authorities began to advocate for the type of regulations that they felt would suit the fishery. At 
the time there wasn’t much official biological research that was being conducted on the 
Zimbabwean side. The first difference was on the size of mesh to be used in the fishery. The
3' Zimbabwe National Archives. Ref. No. SI 194/1647/12. Correspondence from Conservator of Forests to 
the Secretary . Department of Agriculture and Lands. 1945.
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results of the Zambian experiments indicated that there was no need to have a mesh-size 
restriction on gill nets to be uscd.’s They argued that the initial ten centimetres mesh size had 
been an arbitrary size meant to protect species during the stocking exercise as the lake was filling 
up. This measure was interim and had to be modified when results of the experiments had been 
analysed. They argued that the dominant species caught in the five and seven centimetres mesh- 
size nets were Alcstes imberi and Hydrocymis vittatus (Tiger Fish), which, between them, 
comprised eighty six percent of five centimetre net catches and thirty-eight percent of the seven 
centimetres net catches in experimental netting (ibid). Neither of these species was commercially 
attractive and that the effects of using five and seven centimetre mesh-size nets w'as not harmful. 
These nets did not affect dominant commercial species of Tilapia, Labeo and Distichodus to a 
significant extern m ,,,icn these species were caught in these nets they would already have 
spawned (ibid). The nets would not affect Aleslcs imberi cither as this fish has already bred before 
being caught in even a five centimetre net. The nets would, on the other hand, remove large 
quantities of the voracious Hydrocymis vitiates that would be of considerable benefit to the 
fishery (ibid). It was further argued that the prevailing emphasis of removing vegetarian species 
tended to produce an imbalance in the predatory/prey proportions of the fish population. ’9 It was 
observed that the continued use of hundred millimetres mesh-size nets was allowing a constant 
removal of the bigger fish and best breeding stock, reproduction o f the race being left to the small 
and poorer stock. The Director of Game and Fisheries argued that:
In the light of information from research, it was fully agreed that there was no necessity 
whatsoever for continuing to impose the four-inch mesh size as a minimum. If anything, 
encouragement should be given to the use of smaller meshes in an endeavour to achieve a 
more balanced take-off from the fish population. It is not known on what evidence 
Southern Rhodesia bases its desire to persist with the four-inch minimum restriction.4"
The Zimbabwean authorities rejected this proposal arguing that they did not favour any 
changes to the proposed mesh size of hundred millimetres. They counter-proposed that the 
hundred millimetres mesh size should be adhered to until commercial fishing on the lake as a 38940
38 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No: ML 1/15/17 Correspondence from Director of Game and 
Fisheries to Permanent Secretary. Nativ e Affairs. 20tli July 1962.
39 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No: ML 1/15/17 Correspondence from Director of Game and 
Fisheries to Permanent Secretary. Native Affairs. 20th July 1962.
40 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref No. ML 1/15/17. Correspondence from Director of Game and 
Fisheries to Permanent Secretary. Native Affairs. 20/7/60.
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whole had been in operation for a minimum of six months.41 Secondly, the Zimbabwean 
authorities argued that they did not have adequate data to support the Zambian argument on 
mesh-sizes because information collected from commercial fishing concessionaires was 
confidential and not for public use. Thirdly, the Zimbabwean authorities said that they felt it 
undesirable to remove restrictions To avoid confusion to African fishermen.’42
The question of allowing for full-exploitation of the fishery' became another problem in 
designing regulations for the fishery. The authorities on the Zambian side sought to allow tor frill- 
scale commercial fishing using gill nets even before the lake had reached its maximum extent. 
This was largely designed to raise fish-levies for the local Native Authority in line with colonial 
policy at the time. The Zimbabwean authorities did not accept full-scale commercial fishing at 
that time. They argued that there should be no net fishing in the fishery' until stocks had 
stabilised.4’ This restriction on the use of nets, however, applied to African fishermen only. It did 
not extend to the white-owned fishing concessionaires who had been demarcated their own 
fishing grounds. This discriminatory act was justified on the grounds that the concessionaires had 
different contracts with the government and were also assisting in the collection o f data and could 
thus not be restricted from fishing (ibid). Consequently, gill net fishing for African artisanal 
fishermen on the Zimbabwean side w'as not allowed until the passing of the Fish Conservation 
(Kariba Controlled Fishing Area) Regulations in 1962. This contrasts with the Zambian side 
where fishing had commenced as soon as the lake began to fill-up.
The caution taken by the Zimbabwean authorities was borne out o f a number of historical 
factors in the way fisheries policy had developed. Prior to Lake Kariba sport fishing had been the 
main pre-occupation of the fishing industry in the country. This emerged after long years of 
importing exotic species and protecting them against perceived poachers. Not much research had 
emerged in artisanal fishing and it is most likely that the authorities were cautious not to allow for 
full commercial exploitation of the fishery to protect the new' fishery'. The authorities were also 
wanted to make the fishery a source of tourism with sport angling being a part of the sector.
" ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref. No. ML 1/15/17. Correspondence from Secretary of Lake 
Kariba Co-ordinating Committee to Permanent Secretary'. Native Affairs. Northern Rhodesia. 27/6/62.
12 Lake Kariba Co-ordinating Committee. Technical and Organisational Matters relating to Fishing in Lake 
Kariba. 21/3/1963.
14 ZAMBIA NATIONAL ARCHIVES. Ref No: SEC 5/201. Summary' Record of a Meeting of Ministers 
Held in Salisbury on 29/2/60. Kariba Lake Development Company.
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Removing mesh-size restrictions would have led to the removal of even smaller-sized fishes 
thereby reducing the value of the fishery to sport anglers who require more fishes that "have 
virtues of superiority in fighting ability;' While the Tiger Fish was perceived not to be 
economically viable by the Zambian authorities, this was the most-prized specie for sport-anglers 
because of its fighting abilities. Secondly, from the time of colonial conquest the Zimbabwean 
authorities had not developed a police o f using natural resources to fund the administration of 
local administrative structures such as NA's. In Zambia fish was used as a source o f cheap food 
and employment and to generate revenue for the running o f NA's. In Zimbabwe fish did not 
emerge as a source of cheap food. Instead, livestock produce such as beef were promoted. There 
was no agreement reached and different sets of fishing regulations were applied on each 
shoreline.
Introduction o f  co-m anagem ent in the Lake K ariba fishery
In 1989, the DoF in Zambia and the Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute (LKFRI) on 
the Zimbabwean shoreline of the lake, obtained donor funding to coordinate research and 
development activities in the fishery. It was under the auspices of project that co-management 
was conceptualised and implemented. The rationale for introducing this new management 
system, inter alia, was to enforce fishing regulations. The evidence of this destructive 
exploitation was given as "indications of a decline in fish size and an increase in fishing in 
breeding areas and catching of juveniles and use of prohibited fishing methods such as fish- 
driving.' (Chipungu and Moinuddin. 1994: 3). On the Zambian shoreline new institutions at the 
fishing camp level were created. It was through these institutions that the authority for fishermen 
to monitor each other's fishing behaviour was to be delegated. Similar institutions were also 
created on the Zimbabwean shoreline. In addition, some fishermen on both shoreline w:ere 
selected as fish scouts or resource monitors to assist in the implementation of the fishing 
regulations. On both shorelines the fishermen were still expected to monitor the Fisheries Act and 
the Game and Wildlife Act respectively. The manner in which the co-management arrangements 
were conceptualised and implemented on both shorelines did not provide any avenue to re-visit 
the fishing regulations and the reasons why the artisanal fishermen. The regulations were 
considered to relevant to the fishery-. What the co-management sought to achieve was to convince 
the fishermen to observ e them through the delegation of monitoring authority.
Evidence from both shorelines, however, indicates that there has not been a substantial
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change in fishing behaviour. Fish driving, or kiuitmpiila is still widely practiced by artisanal 
fishennen. The fishermen interviewed contended that from their point of view this fishing method 
is not harmful to the fishery. They observed that without employing the method they would not 
catch the fish species that they targeted through hilitmptila. They argued that the system was not 
harmful to the fisherv because they used bigger mesh-sizes that only caught big fish and not those 
which were about to spaw n On the Zimbabwean side the v iolation of fishing regulations such as 
fishing from closed areas or using small mesh-sizes is also rampant. On this shoreline it was 
observed that fishermen have formed well-organised networks to assist them in the violation of 
fishing regulations. These networks report the presence of fish guards. Once the guards arc 
spotted all the illegal fishing implements are hidden.
The institutions created under the co-managcmcnt arrangements have not been as 
effective in monitoring the fishing regulations as was envisaged. The reasons for the non-activity 
of these institutions range from various threats from artisanal fishennen engaged in illegal fishing 
methods and lack of incentives to enforce them. As the resource monitors operate from fishing 
grounds with other fishermen, they arc under various pressures to desist from reporting their 
colleagues who are engaged in illegal fishing practices. What was observed is that the co­
management on cither shoreline was designed to protect the interests of other actors in the two 
inshore fisheries and not primarily to improve the observance of fishing regulations (Malasha. 
2001). The irrelevance of the fishing regulations from the fishermen's perspective remained even 
after the introduction of the new arrangements. As a result, there was no incentive for the 
fishermen to change their fishing behaviour.
C onclusion
This paper has questioned the relevance of existing fishing regulations under the co- 
managerial arrangements in the Zambian and Zimbabwean inshore fisheries of Lake Kariba. The 
paper shows that the existing regulations borrow heavily from the manner in which game was 
managed. Additionally, these fishing regulations had to fit into the economic and social interests 
of the colonial and settler states in the two countries. In Zambia fishing became vital to the 
sustainability of the copper industry. The fishing regulations that emerged sought to maximise the 
availability of fish while at the same time ensuring that fishing was not disrupted through 
perceived destructive fishing methods. The need to balance these sometimes contradictory 
interests saw a continuous and ambiguous implementation of the fishing regulations. Fishing
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regulations could be enforced or lifted whenever particular social and economic interests were 
threatened. In Zimbabwe the fishing regulations that emerged reflected the interests of the settler 
class. Fish angling as a sport was encouraged by a burgeoning sport-fishing lobby from among 
the settler community. The land tenure system further alienated local fishermen as most water 
bodies were on private or state land where access was strictly enforced. The fishing regulations 
that emerged were biased towards creating a fishing industry that reflected the interests of this 
settler class. The regulations promoted fishing as a sport for both recreation and tourism and not 
subsistence.
The differences in the approach towards fishing regulations between the two countries 
manifested themselves when efforts were made to draw regulations for the Lake Kariba fishery. 
While the Zambian authorities favoured a relaxation of the regulations in line with the existing 
policies in their country, the Zimbabweans were more cautious. The latter advocated for tighter 
regulations to protect the fishing stock from indiscriminate fishing by African fishermen. The 
regulations further promoted the fishery as a major tourist attraction with sport angling being one 
of the major attractions In the mid-1980's both countries introduced co-management 
arrangements in their respective inshore fisheries. One of the objectives of this co-management 
arrangement was to ensure that artisanal fishermen observe the existing fishing regulations. 
How ever, this did not occur as fishermen on cither side keep flouting the existing regulations.
It is suggested that one of the reasons is that fishermen do not see the relevance of the 
existing fishing regulations from their perspective. The regulations arc perceived as being 
punitive and hence, arc constantly ignored. It is proposed that when instituting co-managerial 
arrangements there is need to re-visit the regulations governing the utilisation of natural 
resources, as has been presented above, in most southern African countries regulations emerged 
to meet colonial interests The principal reason for these regulations has not changed and this 
could be a reason why regu+ations keep being flouted. Given an opportunity under the various co­
management arrangements, there is need to re-examine the relevance of the existing regulations 
to make them more applicable to current situations.
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